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Linden Lumber: The Demise of
Authorization Cards as a Means of
Establishing Majority Status
In Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB,1 the
Supreme Court addressed questions reserved in their earlier deci-
sion in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 2  The main question left
unanswered by Gissel is aptly framed as follows: In the absence
of the commission of unfair labor practices by an employer that
impair the electoral process, may the National Labor Relations
Board issue a bargaining order requiring that employer to recog-
nize a union as the representative of its employees, solely on the
basis of authorization cards purporting to represent a majority of
the members of the bargaining unit? If the answer to this ques-
tion is in the negative, a second inquiry remains: Which party,
employer or union, should have the burden of petitioning the Board
for an election under Sections 9 (c) (1) (A) and (B) of the National
Labor Relations Act?s
1. 419 U.S. 301 (1974). The decision represents the consolidation of
two cases by the Supreme Court: Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co.
v. NLRB and NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union Local 413, on appeal from the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
2. 395 U.S. 575, 601 n.18 (1968).
3. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159(c)(1) (1970) states in part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with
such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board- (A) by an
employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organ-
ization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number
of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining
and that their employer declines to recognize their representative
To fully understand and appreciate the effect of the Linden
decision, it is essential to examine the scope of the law announced
in Gissel.4 In each of the four cases consolidated in that appeal,
the employer refused to bargain with the union and, in addition,
committed serious unfair labor practices in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act.5 The Supreme Court emphasized the validity
,of the use of authorization cards in lieu of the election procedures
under the Act, holding that a card showing is clearly a valid alter-
native where the "employer has engaged in contemporaneous unfair
labor practices likely to destroy the union's majority and seriously
impede the election."" The holding of Gissel was expressly reaf-
firmed by Linden.7
The facts in Linden can be briefly summarized.8 Upon being
presented with authorization cards representing a majority of the
union's employees and after the union demanded recognition, the
employer suggested that the union petition the Board for an election
pursuant to Section 9(c) (1) (A) of the Act. The union then filed
an election petition but withdrew it when the employer, Linden,
declined to enter into a consent election agreement. 10 Thereafter,
... the Board shall investigate .... If the Board finds upon the
record .. .that such a question of representation exists, it shalldirect an election .... (B) See note 32 infra.
4. 395 U.S. at 600.
5. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1) prohibits employer interference with the
employees' rights under section 157 of the title; Section 158(a)(3) prohib-
its discrimination against employees in regard to hire or tenure of em-
ployment for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging union member-
ship. Section 158(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees.
6. 395 U.S. at 600. See Toltec Metals Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 1122,
1124 (3rd Cir. 1974); See NLRB v. Crispo Cake Cone Co., 464 F.2d 233, 236(8th Cir. 1972); See NLRB v. Fashion Fair Inc., 399 F.2d 764, 768 (6th Cir.
1968), "The seriousness of the unfair labor practices is relevant . . .to the
inquiry whether a fair election can be held." Accord G.P.D. Inc. v. NLRB,
406 F.2d 26, 34, appeal after remand 430 F.2d 963, cert. den. 401 U.S. 974
(6th Cir. 1969).
7. 419 U.S. at 303-304, 306.
8. In the companion case decided along with Linden (supra note 1),
there were eighteen employees in the bargaining unit which the union
sought to represent. The union, with eleven signed and two unsigned
authorization cards, requested recognition. When the employer did not
answer the request, recognitional picketing began. A second request for
recognition was made after the two unsigned cards were signed, but the
employer still refused to recognize the union. Thereafter, the union filed
unfair labor practice charges against the employer.
9. Supra note 3.
10. See generally, A. Cox and D. BOK, LABOR LAw CASES AND MATE-
RIALS, 370 (7th ed. 1969). The words "consent election" mean that the
company and the union or unions concerned enter into a consent election
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the union renewed its demand for collective bargaining and, when
Linden again refused to negotiate, struck for recognition and filed
an unfair labor practice charge against the company for refusing
to bargain." There was no charge brought before the Board that
Linden had engaged in unfair labor practices apart from its refusal
to bargain, 12 thereby presenting the Court with an opportunity
to address the unanswered questions raised by Gissel. In reversing
the holding of the Court of Appeals,'8 the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Board to the effect that Linden should not be
found guilty of an unfair labor practice solely on the basis of its
refusal to accept evidence of majority status other than the results
of a Board election. The Court stated that:
[U] nless an employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice that
impairs the electoral process, a union with authorization cards pur-
porting to represent a majority of the employees, . . . has the bur-
den of taking the next step in invoking the Board's election pro-
cedure.'4
Thus, the rule as established is that a bargaining order will not
issue in cases coming within the factual bounds of Linden.
In addressing themselves to the primary issue left for determina-
tion by Gissel, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority,
emphasized several factors in support of the Board's initial determi-
nation in the cases at bar. Great emphasis was placed on the
discretionary power of the Board.' 5 In reviewing findings of fact,
the reviewing court must accept the Board's findings if such are
supported by "substantial evidence on the record as a whole."' 6
agreement, the principal provisions of which specify the bargaining unit,
the eligibility of voters and the date of the election. Under such agree-
ments, final authority to rule on any disputes is vested in the Regional
Director. In such cases, there is no dispute as to the propriety of a pres-
ent determination of representatives nor real doubt concerning the bar-
gaining unit.
11. Supra note 5.
12. 419 U.S. at 302.
13. 487 F.2d 1099, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Court held:
While we have indicated that cards alone . . . do not necessarily
provide such 'convincing evidence' of majority support so as to
require a bargaining order, they certainly create a sufficient prob-
ability of majority support as to require an employer asserting
doubt of majority status to resolve the possibility through a peti-
tion for an election if he is to avoid both any duty to bargain and
any inquiry into the actuality of his doubt.
14. 419 U.S. at 310.
15. Id. at 309-310.
16. 29 U.S.C. 160 (e), (f). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
Further, a "law-applying judgment is presumptively within the
area of the agency's discretion and thus its conclusion should be
sustained.'u 7  The minority, Mr. Justice Stewart speaking, did not
choose to talk in terms of discretion but rather chose to focus on
the legislative history of the Act. Where legislative history is con-
cerned, the law is clear that a reviewing court is much "more will-
ing to substitute its judgment for that of the Board on matters
that require interpretation of statutory language. . ..",8
The second factor cited by the majority in support of their
decision was the policy of encouraging secret ballot elections under
the Act.19 Two major reasons exist for the favored status of elec-
tions over other means of establishing majority status. First, "the
opportunity for union organizers, including unit employees, to
coerce an employee is far greater when an authorization card is
used instead of a secret ballot. ' 20 Secondly, "it is more likely that
employees will misunderstand the import of signing an authoriza-
tion card because of misreading, failure to read, or union misrepre-
sentation."'2 1 With these factors in mind, it is easy to see why
the Board might become suspicious of methods other than a closely
scrutinized Board election. However, the romanticized view of
Board-conducted elections has not gone without criticism 2 2 and
U.S. 474, 487 (1951); See NLRB v. Florida Canners Co-op, 311 F.2d 541,
544 (1963).
17. L.L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION, 549-550
(1965). This article presents an interesting discussion of the fact-law di-
chotomy and its effect on the discretion invested in administrative agen-
cies. See also NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1943). In that case the
Court was called upon to review the Board's determination as to who was
an "employee" within the meaning of the statute. The Court stated in
part that "[r] esolving that question, like determining whether unfair labor
practices have been committed, belongs to the 'usual administrative rou-
tine' of the Board." See also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941).
18. See A. Cox AND D. BOK, supra note 10 at 143. See also NLRB v.
Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 591 (2nd Cir. 1961). In that case, the
Court was called upon to decide whether an employer was bound by con-
tract to a particular union. ". . . [c]ases that clearly present questions of
law . . .are not governed by statutes such as 10(e) of the Labor Act but
raise the different issue of the degree of deference which courts should
pay to decisions of adminstrative agencies interpreting the statutes they
apply."
19. 419 U.S. at 307.
20. Comment, Employer Recognition of Unions on the Basis of Author-
ization Cards: The Independent Knowledge Standard, 39 U. CHI. L. REv.
314, 318 (1971-72).
21. Id.
22. See Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB
Election, 65 MICH. L. REv. 851, 861-862 (1967), criticizing the romanticized
view of Board conducted elections and the "obession with the infirmities
of authorization cards."
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the minority urged a contrary decision again based on the legisla-
tive history of the NLRA, arguing in part that:
Neither Sec. 9(A) nor Sec. 8 (a) (5), which makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the representa-
tive of his employees, specifies how that representative is to be
chosen. The language of the Act thus seems purposefully designed
to impose a duty on the employer to bargain whenever the union
representative presents convincing evidence of majority support,
regardless of the method by which the support is demonstrated. 23
Mr. Justice Stewart noted that the 1947 amendments to the Taft-
Hartley Act strengthened this interpretation of the NLRA in that
"a proposed change which would have eliminated any method
requiring employer recognition of a union other than a Board
supervised election was rejected in conference. '24
The majority, thereafter, addressed the issue of whether an
exception to their ruling would exist where the employer refuses
recognition of authorization cards in bad faith. In declining to
make such subjective inquiries, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that:
His [the employer's] objection to cards may, of course, mask his
opposition to unions. On the other hand he may have rational,
good-faith grounds for distrusting authorization cards in a given
situation .... To enter that domain is to reject the approval by
Gissel of the retreat which the Board took from its 'good faith' in-
quiries.25
Thus the subjective motivation of the employer for refusing recog-
nition to a union on the basis of a card showing is irrelevant,
according to the majority view.26 In contrast, Mr. Justice Stewart
rejected the majority's fear of making subjective inquiries into an
employer's doubt by attempting to measure "convincing evidence
of majority support" with an objective standard.27 In his view,
such things as a strike vote, a union strike, or authorization cards
signed by a majority of the employees of a given bargaining unit
would clearly be objective criteria for determining sufficient sup-
port 'to avoid a Board-conducted election. Further:
23. 419 U.S. at 311.
24. Id. at 312.
25. Id. at 306.
26. Id. at 305-306. See NLRB v. Drives Inc., 440 F.2d 354, 364 n.18,
cert. den. General Drivers and Dairy Emp., Local Union 563 v. NLRB,
404 U.S. 912 (7th Cir. 1971).
27. 419 U.S. at 314.
... the employer's subjective doubts would be adequately safe-
guarded by Section 9 (c) (1) (B)'s assurance of the right to file his
own petition for an election .... [T]he Act simply does not per-
mit the Board to adopt a rule that avoids subjective inquiries by
eliminating entirely all inquiries into an employer's obligation to
bargain with a non-certified union selected by a majority of his
employees. 28 (Emphasis supplied in original).
By injecting objective criteria into the picture, the minority
confuses the exception addressed by the majority with another and
clearly distinguishable situation. Subjective motivation, such as
bad faith, differs markedly from the situations advanced by the
minority's objective standard. In such cases, the employer has
actual knowledge independent of the union's majority status,
knowledge of a card showing. In cases of "independent knowl-
edge, ' 29 the law is clear that an employer cannot thereafter refuse
to recognize the union's majority status.3 0 The majority recognized
the distinction between the "subjective motivation" and "independ-
ent knowledge" tests, expressly reserving comment on the viability
of the latter."'
Having decided the primary issue in the negative, the majority
then addressed their inquiry to who should have the burden of peti-
tioning the Board for an election. Mr. Justice Douglas cited the
legislative history behind Section 9(c) (1) (B) of the Act in placing
the burden on the union. That section states in part, "Whenever
a petition shall have been filed . . . (B) by an employer alleging
that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented
to him a claim to be recognized as the representative . . . ,82 and
28. Id. at 315.
29. NLRB v. Bratten Pontiac Corp., 406 F.2d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1969).
The "independent knowledge" test stems from the NLRB decision of Snow
and Sons Inc., 134 NLRB No. 57, 709-710 (1961). In that case, the em-
ployer reneged on a "prior agreement" to submit cards to an impartial
third party. The Board found that breach of such prior agreement. pro-
vided sufficient independent knowledge of the union's majority status.
Thereafter in the decision of Pacific Abrasive Supply Co., 182 NLRB No.
48, 329-331 (1970), the Board moved away from the requirement that
there be a "prior agreement" before independent knowledge could be
found. In that case, in addition to presenting authorization cards repre-
senting a majority, the employees also engaged in a strike. Such was
found to satisfy the "independent knowledge" requirement. However, the
Board apparently retreated from the more liberal view of Pacific Abra-
sive in their decision in Linden, supra note 14. The Board's view in
Linden was implicitly adopted by the Supreme Court and currently, an
employer will be deemed to have independent knowledge only where he
has reneged on a prior agreement that some means other than a Board-
conducted election would be sufficient to establish the union's status. See
Linden, 419 U.S. at 310, n.10.
30. 395 U.S. at 591.
31. 419 U.S. at 310.
32. 29 U.S.C. 159(c)(1)(B).
[voL. 3: 197, 1975] Linden Lumber v. N.L.R.B.
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
was construed by the majority in light of legislative history indicat-
ing that such section was intended to give the employer the right,
rather than the obligation, to go forward and seek an election.88
Based on such authority and the Board's discretion in such matters,
Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
The Board has at least some expertise in these matters and its judg-
ment is that an employer's petition for an election . . . is not the
required course . .. [W]e cannot say that the Board's decision
that the union should go forward . . . on the employer's refusal
to recognize the authorization cards was arbitrary and capricious
or an abuse of discretion.8 4
On the other hand, the minority engaged in a bit of semantics by
refusing to refer to the duty of going forward as a "burden,"
stating in part that:
When an employer is confronted with 'convincing evidence of ma-
jority support,' he has the option of petitioning for an election or
consenting to an expedited union-petitioned election. . . . Section
9(c) (1) (B) does not require the employer to exercise this option.
If he does 'not, however, and if he does not voluntarily recognize
the union, he must take the risk that his conduct will be found...
[in] violation of Sec. 8(a) (5). . . . In short, petitioning for an
election is not an employer obligation; it is a device created by
Congress for the employer's self-protection. 5 (emphasis supplied
in original).
Had the Court ruled otherwise on the issue of the propriety of
authorization cards as a viable alternative to the election proce-
dures, -the question as to who has the burden of seeking the elec-
tion would never have been asked in the cases at bar. As it stands,
in view of the majority's ruling on the primary issue, election proce-
dures are matters considered to be within the Board's discretion
and the Court will not substitute its judgment absent an abuse of
discretion. 6
More importantly, the majority's ruling on the central issue
represents an assault on a union's right to establish itself as the
exclusive representative of a bargaining unit by any means showing
"convincing support," other than through the election procedure.8 7
With the destruction of authorization cards as a viable tool in fact
33. 419 U.S. at 307.
34. Id. at 309-310.
35. Id. at 316.
36. Supra note 18.
37. Supra note 3.
situations such as Linden, a union's options are effectively reduced
to one-petitioning the Board for an election under Section
9(c) (1) (A). An employer may ignore a card showing of "convinc-
ing support" regardless of his subjective motivation, if he has no
independent knowledge of majority status,38 and may delay recog-
nition of a bargaining agent until established through the election
procedure. Such result is clearly contrary to the policy of the Act
which has as its basic purpose the removing of sources of indus-
trial strife and unrest by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes.8 9 Perhaps Mr. Lesnick's
observations on the Gissel decision best sum up the questionable
validity of the majority's decision in the instant case. He observes
that:
Cards have been used under the Act for thirty years; the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that certification is not the only route
to representative status; and the 1947 attempt in the House-passed
Hartley Bill to amend Section 8 (a) (5) to require employer recogni-
tion of certified unions only, was rejected by the conference com-
mittee that produced the Taft-Hartley Act. No amount of drum-
beating should be permitted to overcome, without legislation, this
history.40
Wesley R. Harrison
38. Supra note 30.
39. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151. "It is declared to be the policy of the United
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce . . .by encouraging the practice and procedure of col-
lective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of . . .de-
signation of representatives of their own choosing ... 
40. Supra note 23.
